November Madness: A Proposal for Representative Democracy Brackets to Eliminate the Undue Influence of Money on Elections by Valentine, Daniel P
Texas A&M Law Review 
Volume 4 Issue 1 
2016 
November Madness: A Proposal for Representative Democracy 
Brackets to Eliminate the Undue Influence of Money on Elections 
Daniel P. Valentine 
Texas A & M University School of Law, dpv@tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Election Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel P. Valentine, Comment, November Madness: A Proposal for Representative Democracy Brackets to 
Eliminate the Undue Influence of Money on Elections, 4 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 137 (2016). 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Texas A&M Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, 
please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
COMMENT
NOVEMBER MADNESS: A PROPOSAL FOR
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY BRACKETS
TO ELIMINATE THE UNDUE INFLUENCE
OF MONEY ON ELECTIONS
by Daniel P. Valentine*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION................................. ......... 138
II. POLITICAL FINANCING: WHO Buys WHAT.............. 140
A. Campaign Costs..... ........................ 140
B. Campaign Funding........................... 141
C. Funding Private Messages ..... ................. 143
D. What the Money Buys .................. ....... 144
III. THE LAw: POLITICAL SPEECH, EQUAL PROTECTION,
AND THE MANNER OF HOLDING ELECTIONS............ 145
A. Freedom of Speech.................................. 145
1. Direct Campaign Contributions................. 146
2. Identity or Nature of Contributors ............. 148
3. Burden by Penalizing Speech................... 149
B. Makeup of the Electorate ........................... 150
1. Presidential Electors............................ 151
a. Populist Objections to Current Presidential
Elector Selection ....................... 153
b. Federalist Objections to Current Presidential
Elector Selection ....................... 155
2. Congressional Electors..................... 155
3. Permissible Disenfranchisement .............. 156
C. Manner of Holding Elections .................... 157
1. Redistricting ............................. 158
2. Voter Registration ......................... 159
3. Absentee Ballots .......................... 159
4. Choice by the People ...................... 160
D. Political Parties and Access to the Ballot............ 160
IV. COMPARATIVE DECISION MAKING ...................... 161
A. The United States Constitution: Decisions by
Representatives .. ............................... 161
* J.D. candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law. The Author wishes to
thank Lynne Rambo for valuable comments and suggestions. All opinions expressed
in this Comment-and any errors-are solely those of the Author, and should not be




138 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
B. Other Manners of Choosing........................ 164
1. Direct Popular Election........................ 164
2. Parliamentary Systems......................... 164
3. Loya Jirga ..................................... 165
V. A PROPOSAL TO MAKE EXTREME SPENDING
UNNECESSARY ............................................. 165
A. Respect for First Amendment ...................... 167
B. Representative Democracy ......................... 168
C. Choosing a Representative You Trust .............. 168
D. Potential Obstacles................................. 168
1. Court Challenges to Revised Election
Processes ...................................... 169
2. Political Parties ................................ 170
3. Media Companies ............................. 170
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................... 171
I. INTRODUCTION
There is great tension between two fundamental principles of
American society: the right to free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment' and the guarantee of effective democracy.2 Both are ab-
solute in the minds of at least some Americans.' When an irresistible
force interacts with an immovable object, great destructive power can
be unleashed.' Prudence dictates that the best solution further the
ends of absolutists on both sides by eliminating conflict. This Com-
ment seeks to describe one such solution.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. The fundamental status of democracy is evident throughout the canon of his-
torical documents. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776) ("Governments ... deriv[e] their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned . . . ."); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . ."); Abraham Lincoln,
Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863),
in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P. Basler ed., Da
Capo Press 2d ed. 2001) (1990) ("[G]overnment of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth.").
3. See, e.g., Tim Black, Yes, Freedom of Speech Should be Absolute, FREE SPEECH
NOW! (July 30, 2014), http://www.spiked-online.com/freespeechnow/fsn-article/yes-
freedom-of-speech-should-be-absolute [https://perma.cc/D92C-XJEN]; Liz Kennedy,
Top 5 Ways Citizens United Harms Democracy & Top 5 Ways We're Fighting to Take
Democracy Back, DEMOS 1 (2015), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publica
tions/Citizens%20United%2OTop%205_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP87-NM8J].
4. The classic paradox can be criticized as a word game that does not admit of
detailed analysis. See Mike Alder, Newton's Flaming Laser Sword, PHIL. Now,
May-June 2004, at 29. Nevertheless, the imagery captures the imagination in both
scholarly articles and popular culture. See, e.g., Erin A. Shackelford, An Immovable
Object and an Unstoppable Force: Reconciling the First Amendment and Antidis-
crimination Laws in the Claybrooks Court, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 781 (2015);
BATMAN V. SUPERMAN: DAWN OF JUSTICE (Warner Brothers 2016).
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Candidates and other interested parties spend billions of dollars in
each election.' To eliminate the incidence or appearance of quid pro
quo corruption, legislatures can and do limit the amount of money
that candidates may accept from an individual donor.6 In light of the
protections of the First Amendment,' however, legislatures are not
able to limit expenditures by any parties to express their own views.8
To the extent that there are disparities in the wealth of speakers or of
their supporters, there will be comparable disparities in the reach of
people's speech. Reducing the effect of this disparity is a valid public
interest, particularly in furtherance of the accepted interest of reduc-
ing corruption,9 but the Supreme Court has not found it a compelling
interest that justifies a burden on free political speech.'o Reducing the
undue effect of disparities in wealth on the equal participation of all
people in the political process requires mechanisms that do not bur-
den the speech of others.
Candidates use campaign money for many purposes, but given the
size of the electorate in modern races," they must spend the vast ma-
jority on mass marketing to reach all relevant voters with a message
that may inspire their support.12 Because it can create irrational as-
sociations and behaviors in the public,'3 mass marketing is a poor fit
as the main tool informing the decisions of most voters.14 When
5. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976) (per curiam) (carving out a limited
exception to free speech to minimize the appearance of corruption through large indi-
vidual donations to campaigns).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59. See also infra Section III.A for a discussion of free
speech jurisprudence.
9. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721,
777-78 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 749-50 (majority opinion); see also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554
U.S. 724, 741-42 (2008).
11. See infra Section III.B (discussing the current set of voters for various offices
and the developments that led to a mass electorate).
12. In the 2012 presidential campaign, the Washington Post calculated that televi-
sion advertising supporting the two major primary candidates cost a combined 896
million dollars. Mad Money: TV Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presiden
tial-campaign-ads-2012/ [https://perma.cc/V94G-GHZG].
13. Dan Ariely has posited that consumers in general act irrationally, but in a
predictable way, making it possible for marketers to take advantage of those behavior
patterns to manipulate consumers. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL:
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); see also On Amir & Orly
Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2098 (2008) (reviewing ARIELY, supra, and RICHARD H.
THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008), and linking their effect on law and policy).
14. See Bill Mordan, Election Marketing, ACC DOCKET 160, 160 (2007) ("In the
worst campaigns, a candidate does not advertise her virtues or values, credentials, or
credibility. She only has to convince the voter that her opponent is corrupt, immoral,
or incompetent.").
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searching for a method to reduce the effect of money on elections,
society should prefer a viable solution that focuses voters' decision-
making on areas that they can judge effectively and efficiently.
As one approach that would not offend the Constitution, this Com-
ment proposes Representative Democracy Brackets, a multi-level
manner of choosing candidates in which all voters have an equal
voice, but which by its structure reduces the effect of mass marketing
in favor of a focus on forming and evaluating interpersonal relation-
ships. By implementing Representative Democracy Brackets, a state
or the United States can achieve the twin benefits of decreasing the
undue effects of political spending and increasing the quality of the
resulting decisions. The proposed brackets winnow the pool of vot-
ers until it is small enough to make an informed decision.1 6
Part II of this Comment defines the problem by reviewing the cur-
rent state of campaign expenditures and the potentially negative ef-
fects of those expenditures on elections. To define the space within
which changes could be made, Part III discusses the law, including
recent case law, that governs the financing and manner of holding
elections. Part IV describes other decision-making processes and their
features. Finally, Part V proposes Representative Democracy Brack-
ets as a viable solution, identifying the key success factors and the
challenges to state or national implementation.
II. POLITICAL FINANCING: WHO BuYs WHAT
A. Campaign Costs
They cost a lot. In the words of the Supreme Court,
virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass soci-
ety requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the hum-
blest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs.
Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publiciz-
ing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television,
radio, and other mass media for news and information has made
15. And people love brackets. See, e.g., 2016 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball
Championship: Official Bracket, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/interactive-bracket/
basketball-men/d1 [https://perma.cc/7C35-2MSC]. The proposal of this Comment is,
however, a set of brackets to determine who will choose the candidate rather than as
a means of choosing the final office holder.
16. Many news organizations have conceived, at varying levels of facetiousness, of
elections in which the pool of candidates is winnowed in a system that parallels the
brackets of a sports tournament. See, e.g., Matt Rivera, Republican Debates
Reimagined as Tournament Brackets, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015, 5:10 PM), http://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/gop-debates-reimagined-tournament-brackets-
n404746 [https://perma.cc/93JU-7DE2] (commenting on the large pool of candidates
in the early phases of the campaign for the 2016 Republican Party nomination); Philip
Bump, OK, Fine: Here's the 2016 Election if it Were an NCAA Bracket, WASH. POST
(Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/03/16/ok-fine-
heres-the-2016-election-if-it-were-an-ncaa-bracket/ [https://perma.cc/LU2B-NBUV]
(humorously handicapping the candidates in a March Madness analogy).
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these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments
of effective political speech.17
For example, in the 2012 campaign for President of the United
States, almost 1.3 billion dollars were spent by four general election
candidates and ten additional primary candidates." In the same elec-
tion cycle, 251 candidates for the Senate spent 748 million dollars and
1,698 candidates for the House of Representatives spent 1.1 billion
dollars.19 While that amounts to ten dollars spent by campaigns for
federal office for every man, woman, and child in the United States,20
the amount spent per eligible voter was fifteen dollars,2 1 and per ac-
tual voter was thirty-three dollars.2 2 The amount per voter spent in
truly contested areas was even higher.
The more voters there are (and the more contested a race is) the
more spending there is. This fits standard marketing strategy: a clear
brand leader in a local market needs only to maintain the brand im-
age, while close competitors on a statewide or national scale must
seek an edge through marketing to a wide range of people. The result
is that larger groups of voters attract more campaign spending, partic-
ularly in a closely contested race.
B. Campaign Funding
Because of all that spending, the money has to come from some-
where. Some comes from the candidates themselves. Wealthy candi-
dates can avoid any perceived obligation to donors23 by using their
own money to pay for campaign expenses. While this minimizes the
potential for quid pro quo corruption, self-financing adds further dis-
17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
18. Presidential Campaign Disbursements Through December 31, 2012, FED.
ELECTION COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2012/tables/presidential/Pres
2_2012 24m.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQU2-L6UJ].
19. House and Senate Financial Activity Through December 31, 2012, FED. ELEC-
TION COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2012/tables/congressional/Con
Cand1_2012_.24m.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LPV-3CRU].
20. See Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015). The population estimate of the Census Bureau for Dec. 31,
2012 was 315 million. Id. Compared to the total campaign spending for that year's
federal elections of 3.15 billion dollars, that spending comes to about $10 per person.
21. See THOM FILE, WHO VOTES? CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE AMERI-
CAN ELECTORATE: 1978-2014 3 (2015), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/li
brary/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWS9-JYSS]. The Census
Bureau estimates a total of 210,800,000 United States citizens of voting age in 2010,
resulting in $14.94 per (potentially) eligible voter.
22. Id. With 96 million actual voters in the election, the spending per voter in
aggregate was $32.82.
23. See, e.g., COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE:
ENDING THE BIG DONOR CULTURE 23 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/228646/8208.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VJ8-
72XR] (describing British popular skepticism of the ability of political parties to resist
donor motivations).
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tortions to the process. Whether the wealth was inherited or earned, it
was not gained by the candidate because of his or her prowess at the
type of government role to which the candidate hopes to be elected.
As a result, those funds will amplify the message of a candidate with-
out regard to the value or even the veracity of the message.2 4 Anyone
is free to present the message of his or her choice. Nevertheless, an
electoral process in which people who speak the loudest are able to
affect or overcome the judgment of the voters could bias the political
process towards the interests of the wealthy.25 Those interests may not
be in the interest of the people as a whole.
A large portion of the money required for political campaigns
comes from contributors whose donations must be solicited by the
candidates or their campaigns. As a result, incumbent politicians are
required to spend an inordinate amount of time soliciting contribu-
tions for their next campaign.26 That time could otherwise be spent
doing the job that they were elected to perform.27 This diversion of
our public servants from their duties is one of the costs required by
the current campaign finance process.
In an effort to reduce the fundraising efforts required of the candi-
dates themselves, motivated supporters can bring individual donors
together. Bundling allows one supporter to multiply his or her effec-
tiveness by convincing a number of individual donors to contribute
together, giving the bundler prominence and visibility. 28 Because of
the prominence of hosts of fundraising dinners or campaign bundlers
who promote the donation of significant funds, bundling can tend to
overcome the benefits of the limits on individual contributions. While
technically adhering to the individual contribution limits that are per-
missible under Buckley v. Valeo as a means of minimizing the inci-
dence or appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the bundling process
raises the same concerns.2 9 The appearance of impropriety is sug-
24. It has also been contended that billionaire self-financed candidates have ad-
vantages over those supported by billions of dollars through super-PACs, in that polit-
ical campaigns have privileged access to the purchase of political advertising. Ben
Jacobs, Donald Trump's Self-Financed Campaign Could Squeeze Rivals' Ads off TV,
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/
donald-trump-self-financed-campaign-ads-tv [https://perma.cc/4UJ7-RGWT].
25. But see JENNIFER A. STEEN, SELF-FINANCED CANDIDATES IN CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 94 (2006) (finding in a study of campaigns that self-financed candidates
rarely win the seats they seek).
26. Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 217, 232-33 (2010).
27. Id.
28. See FAQ on Lobbyist Bundling, FED. ELECTION COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/
law/lobbybundlingfaq.shtml [https://perma.cc/G9ZM-HWPG].
29. In an effort to eliminate that work-around, Senator Michael Bennett has pro-
posed counting the results of bundling against any individual contribution limits that
apply to the lobbyist or bundler. Carrie Levine & Michael Beckel, Senate Bill Would
Limit Lobbyists from Bundling Campaign Donations, TIME (June 4, 2015), http://
time.com/3908822/lobbyists-campaign-donations/ [https://perma.cc/A8T6-DRVP].
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gested by the access that such massive fundraisers have to the candi-
dates and the campaigns. Does a person who can motivate a thousand
individual donors have any less influence than a similarly situated in-
dividual who contributes one thousand times the maximum amount
currently allowable by the Federal Elections Commission? Political
parties play a similar role.
Still other funding comes from the news media. When candidates
can prove sufficiently entertaining or newsworthy, they can avoid
spending campaign funds or their own money by allowing the news
media to carry their message. While such a plan does not allow the
candidate fully to control a nuanced message, it has proved successful
for some candidates who were already well known before the
campaign.3 0
Whether the money funding election communications comes from
the candidates, from donors, or from the news media, citizens with
more money are able to have a larger direct effect on the reach of
those communications. Self-funded campaigns allow wealthy individu-
als to reach more voters than less wealthy people can. Campaigns
funded by donors must struggle both with the time that fundraising
takes from the job the candidate should be doing and with the per-
ceived (or actual) additional access and influence that key fundraisers
have. Campaigns that rely on media support risk that those media will
take control (or appear to take control) of the message. While the
First Amendment generally protects these expenditures, they remain
a potential source of distortion of the voting process.
C. Funding Private Messages
People and organizations independent of the candidates also speak
and support candidates. While they may not permissibly coordinate
their communications with the campaigns, such private actors are able
to promote their messages at will." Although they may not actively
coordinate with the campaign, they may serve to amplify messages
that are presented by a campaign and they may also serve to attack
opponents of a candidate without that candidate's having to make the
attack personally.
30. See, e.g., Salvatore Colleluori, Fox News Has Given Donald Trump Nearly $30
Million in Free Airtime During the Presidential Campaign, MEDIA MATTERS: BLOG
(Jan. 12, 2016, 10:45 AM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2016/01/12/fox-news-has-
given-donald-trump-nearly-30-milli/207912 [https://perma.cc/UZ3E-6V8X] (calculat-
ing the advertising value of coverage of an entertaining presidential candidate and
quoting that candidate on the reduced need for campaign spending).
31. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam)) ("The Supreme
Court declared this expenditure ban unconstitutional, holding that corporations may
not be prohibited from spending money for express political advocacy when those
expenditures are independent from candidates and uncoordinated with their
campaigns.").
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D. What the Money Buys
Large-scale political campaigns have expanded from yard signs and
lapel pins to full-scale mass marketing, using all the techniques and
experience of the advertising industry.3 2 Mass marketing techniques
emphasize branding rather than a true investigation of issues or candi-
dates. The result is an electorate informed almost solely by mass me-
dia. While levels of information vary, the fact that the opinions of
most voters are formed by one or two media outlets suggests that they
are to some extent guided by those outlets in making their decisions.
Sir William Blackstone,'writing about the laudable goal of universal
suffrage, suggested that those "who are suspected to have no will of
their own, [should be] excluded from voting, in order to set other indi-
viduals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more thoroughly
upon a level with each other."3 While Blackstone was primarily con-
cerned (possibly influenced by Montesquieu) with the direct influence
of the wealthy on those dependent on their estates, the argument can
be broadened to suggest that any system that enables the few to con-
trol the information and judgment of the voters is to be avoided.34 To
the extent that the undue influence of money is limiting the indepen-
dence of voters, Blackstone's concerns have come to fruition.
The techniques of mass marketing and consumer data collection are
also applied to information about voters to help campaigns tune their
messages to be more effective for each targeted individual." To the
extent that voters are aware of it, this data collection may have a chil-
ling effect on their political activities. Privacy questions aside, the
specificity of the resulting messages makes the communication more
about the voter than about the candidate. That targeted micro-mes-
saging can result in deceptive attempts at voter suppression" and in
messages that deceptively align the position of a candidate with that of
32. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (describing the evolution of campaigns into mass-
marketing machines); see generally RICHARD S. TEDLOW, NEW AND IMPROVED: THE
STORY OF MASS MARKETING IN AMERICA (1990) (describing the evolution of general
marketing toward branding).
33. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2000) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765)).
34. Id. at 8-9; see infra Part V (discussing one proposal to structure the system to
reduce undue influence).
35. See generally Kwame N. Akosah, Note, Cracking the One-Way Mirror: How
Computational Politics Harms Voter Privacy, and Proposed Regulatory Solutions, 25
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1007, 1012-15 (2015) (discussing invest-
ments in social media and merging voter and consumer data to target messages).
36. Id. at 1031 (citing Chris Evans, Note, It's the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-
Mining and Voter Privacy in the Information Age, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 867
(2012)).
37. See Nichole Rustin-Paschal, Online Behavioral Advertising and Deceptive
Campaign Tactics: Policy Issues, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 907, 912-13 (2011).
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a targeted voter.3 8 Furthermore, the data can encourage candidates to
ignore voters and neighborhoods that they deem irrelevant to their
campaign strategies.3 9
Branding associates candidates with a party (or with their own
crafted image) in a way that may not adequately inform the voters of
the views or character of the candidate. A decision to associate one-
self with a political brand can give a candidate the benefits (and po-
tential liabilities) of the reputation of the party or the brand, whether
that reputation fits the candidate directly or not.4 0 Some candidates,
for example Richard Nixon, who were in the national spotlight for
many years before a successful election as president, do not have the
opportunity to redefine their brand before their presidential cam-
paign.41. Others, like Barack Obama, who have limited prior national
exposure are more able to tailor their brand marketing to the interests
of their target constituencies.4 2
III. THE LAw: POLITICAL SPEECH, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE
MANNER OF HOLDING ELECTIONS
A. Freedom of Speech
"Come on, come on, listen to the money talk."4 3 While the freedom
of speech was long held to ensure a freedom of the content of speech,
the list of manners of expression that can count as speech has ex-
panded over time to include motion pictures and financial
expenditures.4 4
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that the United States not "abridge the freedom of speech."4 5 This
core political freedom has been at odds with many approaches to
modifying the effect of money on the electoral process.46 While limita-
38. Daniel Kreiss, Yes We Can (Profile You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and
Political Data, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 70, 74 (2012) ("Campaigns are increasingly
tailoring political communications down to narrowly defined segments of the electo-
rate, and even to individuals, through direct mail, online advertisements, and face-to-
face voter contact. This means that campaigns can develop narrow appeals based on
ideology and self-interest and direct them to different groups of voters, appearing to
be all things to all people.").
39. Id. at 73-74.
40. See LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (2015)
(portraying Aaron Burr as a political opportunist who chose a party for brand mar-
keting rather than for political affinity).
41. LISA SPILLER & JEFF BERGNER, BRANDING THE CANDIDATE: MARKETING
STRATEGIES TO WIN YOUR VOTE 7 (2011).
42. Id. at 7-8.
43. AC/DC, Moneytalks, on THE RAZORS EDGE (Atco Records 1990), quoted in
DAVID SCHULTz, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 229 (2014).
44. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures); see infra
notes 46-83 and accompanying text (campaign expenditures).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating
federal relaxation of campaign finance laws tied to the spending of competing candi-
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tions on direct contributions to candidates have been justified by the
legislative interest in reducing the opportunity for and appearance of
corruption,4 7 limitations on who may spend money and on how much
they may spend in other ways have not found a justification in recent
decisions.48 This Section addresses several approaches to restricting
election financing and describes the Court's jurisprudence with regard
to the strict scrutiny due a content-based burden on the freedom of
speech.49
1. Direct Campaign Contributions
In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 ("FECA"), creating limitations on the permissible size of direct
contributions to candidates for federal office.so The Court tested the
system of limitations imposed by FECA in Buckley v. Valeo, and
found direct contribution limits to be a valid means of limiting the
appearance of corruption but expenditure limits an undue burden on
the political speech of a candidate." On the eve of the first presiden-
tial election after FECA's enactment, a wide array of political candi-
dates, parties, and contributors joined in a lawsuit to challenge the
constitutionality of both its expenditure limits and its contribution lim-
its.52 Finding the elimination of both actual corruption and the ap-
pearance of corruption to be a compelling interest in protecting
democracy, the Court held that the modest burden on expression
caused by limitations on direct contributions to candidates was justi-
dates as a burden on the speech of those candidates); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating a federal ban on corporate contributions
to campaigns); Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per
curiam) (invalidating a century-old state statute barring corporate contributions to
political campaigns); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721 (2011) (invalidating state public funding tied to the spending of a privately funded
candidate as a burden on the privately funded candidate's speech); McCutcheon v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating aggregate limits on cam-
paign contributions to multiple candidates).
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976) (per curiam).
48. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
49. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (upholding a limited
electioneering ban around polling places as a narrowly tailored response to a compel-
ling state interest). In describing the standard in Burson, Justice Blackmun wrote,
"The State must show that the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' Id. (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
50. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-68 (1974) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) (Supp.
II 2015)).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 ("In sum, although the Act's contribution and expendi-
ture limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expendi-
ture ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of
political expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions.").
52. Id. at 7-8.
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fied. 3 The Court upheld but discussed only briefly the provision that
limited a person's total contributions to all candidates in any year to
$25,000.54
The Court continued its analysis in Buckley by considering the con-
stitutionality of limitations on expenditures.5 Unlike limiting contri-
butions, the limitations on expenditures by political parties and
candidates did not serve to limit corruption and significantly burdened
political expression.56 In discussing the limitations, the Court rejected
the suggested state interest in creating parity in the ability to express
political ideas." The Court struck down all the expenditure limitations
challenged and found some powers delegated by Congress to the Fed-
eral Election Commission to be reserved by the Constitution to Of-
ficers of the United States, but left intact contribution limitations,
financial reporting requirements, and public campaign financing.58
Congress acted quickly to revise FECA during an election year.59
Although the Court has upheld limitations of contributions from
one contributor to one candidate, limitation of the aggregate contribu-
tion of one contributor to all candidates is an unjustified burden on
free speech.60 In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the
Court struck down the portion of FECA that purported to limit the
total amount a contributor could donate to all federal candidates in a
two-year period.6 1 Shaun McCutcheon challenged the limits, claiming
a desire to contribute to dozens of candidates.62 While each contribu-
tion would be within the limits for contribution to an individual candi-
date, the total value would exceed the statutory limit for aggregated
contributions.6 3 In a plurality opinion Chief Justice John Roberts rea-
53. Id. at 24-30.
54. Id. at 38. The aggregate contribution provision was overturned in 2014 on the
grounds that unlike large individual contributions that could give the appearance of
impropriety, large aggregate totals of small donations do not create the appearance of
corruption but do burden the expression and association rights of the contributor.
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality
opinion).
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
56. Id. at 47-48.
57. Id. at 48-49; see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
564 U.S. 721 (2011) (holding that the state's alleged interest in leveling the playing
field for candidates does not justify a First Amendment burden).
58. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
59. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 486-95 (1976) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) (Supp. II
2015)).
60. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (Roberts,
C.J.) (plurality opinion) ("[A]ggregate limits do little, if anything, to address (the]
concern [of curbing corruption], while seriously restricting participation in the demo-
cratic process.").
61. Id. at 1442-43 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2012) (current version at 52
U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(3) (West 2014))).
62. Id. at 1443.
63. Id.
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soned that the First Amendment precludes aggregate limits on contri-
butions to multiple candidates because the individual-candidate limits
sufficiently serve the state's interest in limiting actual or apparent cor-
ruption.6 4 The aggregate limits thus created an unjustified burden on
those who broadly exercise their rights.65
2. Identity or Nature of Contributors
The Tillman Act of 1907 prohibited corporate donations to candi-
dates in federal elections, making it the first federal campaign finance
reform legislation.6 6 In response to controversy over corporate dona-
tions to the successful 1904 campaign of Theodore Roosevelt, Con-
gress acted to ban political contributions from corporations or
national banks." The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 extended political
spending prohibitions by forbidding independent expenditures by cor-
porations or labor unions in support of or against a specific
candidate.6 8
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Justice Kennedy
wrote for the Court as it invalidated restrictions on the free speech of
corporations that had stood for more than sixty years." This decision
foreclosed the legislative approach of restricting the rights of organi-
zations in ways that would be impermissible if applied to individuals.o
While it has been argued that corporations and labor unions are not
people and thus undeserving of constitutional protection, they are at
their core associations of people.7 ' Furthermore, unlike many consti-
64. Id. at 1450 ("[W]hile preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate
objective, Congress may target only a specific type of corruption-'quid pro quo'
corruption.").
65. Id. at 1449 ("It is no answer to say that the individual can simply contribute
less money to more people. To require one person to contribute at lower levels than
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special
burden on broader participation in the democratic process."); see also infra Section
III.A.3 (discussing similar burdens found in public election financing schemes).
66. BRIAN L. FIFE, REFORMING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN AMERICA: TOWARD
MORE DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (2010).
67. Id. See generally Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. II 2015)).
68. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
69. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010).
70. Id. at 341 ("We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.").
71. In his dissent, Justice Stevens wrote, "[Corporations] cannot vote or run for
office." Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Likening
corporations, with their potential for foreign control, to foreign nationals or nonresi-
dents, Stevens suggested that their rights to free speech did not require the same
protection as the rights of eligible voters. Id. But see Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring)) (holding that First Amendment protections apply to all "persons" who
lawfully enter the country). Professor Piety makes a thoughtful discussion of the his-
tory of the application of free speech to corporations, noting that an initial goal of
consumer protection may be subverted by general free speech rights. Tamara R. Piety,
2016] UNDUE INFLUENCE OF MONEY ON ELECTIONS 149
tutional protections of rights, the First Amendment does not specify
whose "freedom of speech" is not to be abridged.72
On grounds nearly identical to those enunciated in Citizens United,
in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court struck
down a Montana law restricting corporate contributions to political
campaigns." By invalidating the century-old prohibition, the Court
emphasized that in light of Citizens United the application of First
Amendment protections to corporate speech applies to all govern-
ments subject to the Constitution.4
3. Burden by Penalizing Speech
While some public funding programs appear to be valid, the Court
has held others to be unconstitutional, not because of public funding
in itself, but rather because the inducements to participate in the pub-
lic funding program unduly burdened the free speech of non-partici-
pant candidates.
In 2008, the Court held in Davis v. Federal Election Commission
that free speech actions of a candidate cannot permissibly trigger a
relaxation of federal campaign finance laws for rivals. Jack Davis
was a candidate for the House of Representatives in New York who
chose to finance his campaigns in 2004 and 2006 primarily from his
own funds.6 Because he spent more than $350,000 on his campaigns,
the so-called Millionaire's Amendment allowed his opponents to re-
ceive larger contributions from individual donors and to receive con-
tributions from donors who had already reached the aggregate cap.77
Citing the complete rejection of expenditure limitations in Buckley,
Justice Alito wrote for the majority that allowing a candidate's expen-
diture to trigger a relaxation of contribution restrictions on his rivals
burdened his exercise of that free speech right." The Court found that
leveling the opportunities of less wealthy candidates was not a com-
The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights Movement, 11 J. Bus. & TECH.
L. 1 (2016).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech . . . ."). But cf id. amend. II ("[T]he right of the people to keep and bear
[a]rms .... ); id. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects . .. ."); id. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer
... ; nor shall any person be. . . ."); id. amend. IX ("shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people"); id. amend. X ("The powers ... are re-
served to the [s]tates respectively, or to the people."); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All per-
sons . . . are citizens . .. ; nor shall any state deprive any person . . . .").
73. See Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 2491.
75. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 743-44 (2008).
76. Id. at 731.
77. Id. at 729-30 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-
155, § 319(a), 116 Stat. 81, 109 (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30117(a) (Supp. II
2015))); see also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (describing the invalidation
of the aggregate limits that formed part of the relaxed regulations in Davis).
78. Id. at 738-40 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-58 (1976)).
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pelling government interest, and thus that the burden was not
justified."
In 2011 with similar reasoning, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the Court held that increased public
financing of rivals was an unconstitutional burden on the speech of a
candidate whose expenditures triggered the increased funding.so A
group of candidates and office holders in Arizona and two political
action committees challenged the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections
Act, which provided for public funding of campaigns at a fixed
amount, which was increased to match the expenditures of a candidate
not participating in the public funding program once they exceeded
the public-finance limit." As in Davis, the Court found that benefits
to opponents triggered by a candidate's exercise of free speech was a
burden requiring justification by a compelling state interest.82 While
the mechanism of benefit was different, the matching funds triggered
by a candidate's spending were even more problematic because the
matching automatically funded all publicly financed opponents and
amplified only the speech of those opponents.
B. Makeup of the Electorate
"I say the future is ours, if you can count."84 Making the vote of
each eligible voter count equally is essential when choosing our lead-
ers. This Comment focuses on making the individual voters count
equally rather than allowing those willing and able to spend more
money to have a greater influence on the process." The efficacy of
(and need for) the campaign expenditures and marketing techniques
described in Part II depends primarily on a large electorate that does
not have personal knowledge of the candidates available for its choice.
79. Id. at 740-42. The Court also dismissed the argument that the relaxation
served to reduce the impact on harsh contribution laws because Congress could sim-
ply raise the limits in all cases. Id. at 742-43. The valid interest in Buckley of reducing
corruption was not present in the statute at issue in Davis. Id. at 740-41.
80. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 755
(2011).
81. Id. at 727-34 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952(A)-(C) (2012)).
82. Id. at 736.
83. Id. at 736-84. Even worse in the Court's opinion, because the statute could
also be triggered by independent groups supporting the self-financed candidate, the
burden was not only on the free speech of the candidate, but also on the free speech
of those other groups. Id. at 739-40.
84. THE WARRIORS (Paramount Pictures 1979). Gang president Cyrus exhorted a
meeting of competitive gangs to evaluate the relative numbers of their members com-
pared to those of the police. The quote can be read in the context of this Comment to
refer to the value of making the perceptions and judgment of each eligible voter count
in an election.
85. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 88 (Everyman's Library 1993) (1945)
("ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL
THAN OTHERS.").
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Subject to the guidance of the Constitution, the states determine
who is eligible to vote in both local and federal elections.8 6 The direct
guidance from the Constitution is limited to (1) the imposition of con-
sequences if any male citizens aged twenty-one or older are denied the
right to vote for a reason other than crime or rebellion, (2) the pro-
hibition of denial of the right to vote on account of sex,8 and (3) the
prohibition of the denial of the right to vote on account of age, pro-
vided that the citizen is eighteen years of age.89 Under the legislative
power and judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause,90
however, the federal government has further refined the details of the
eligibility to vote and the equality of representation.91 Although eligi-
bility to vote has been made nearly uniform throughout the United
States, this Section describes the extent of that eligibility for federal
offices and what protections and variability has been left to the states.
1. Presidential Electors
The Constitution, in Article II, allocates electors to the states in
proportion to their representation in Congress, and requires the
states' legislatures to determine their method of appointing presiden-
tial electors.92 Because the legislatures may choose any method to ap-
point those electors, there is no right to vote for electors for president
86. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (giving state legislatures the power to decide
how to appoint presidential electors); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (making the electors who may
choose Representatives in Congress the same as those who may choose state legisla-
tors); id. amend. XVII (amending the original selection process for Senators to align
with that for Representatives); see also United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829,
830-31 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459) (emphasizing that the right or privilege of
voting is defined by the state and holding that arbitrary limitations on voting are per-
missible under the Fourteenth Amendment).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2 (declaring a reduction in the representation
of a state in Congress to the extent that eligible voters are inappropriately denied the
franchise). While the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit disenfranchisement
on grounds other than rebellion or crime, it does create a specific penalty for doing so.
The legislative power to enforce the entire Fourteenth Amendment further allows
Congress to explicitly prohibit such discrimination as it deems necessary. Id. amend.
XIV, § 5.
88. Id. amend. XIX.
89. Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
90. See id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (requiring equal protection of the laws); id.
amend. XIV, § 5 (granting the power to enforce the amendment).
91. See infra Section III.C.1 (discussing equal protection requirements affecting
state determination of eligibility).
92. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. But see id. amend. XXIII (granting the District of
Columbia electors as though it were a state). In his book explaining complex concepts
in simple words, Randall Munroe explains the electors: "The states get to choose the
leaders by a point system where each state gets one point for each Law Maker it has."
RANDALL MUNROE, THING EXPLAINER: COMPLICATED STUFF IN SIMPLE WORDS 14
(2015) (referring to its Article I explanation in which it calls the members of Congress
"Law Makers"). He goes on to comment, "No matter how many changes people
make to this system, it will probably never quite work right." Id. The Author hopes
that is not true.
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unless a state's legislature creates one.93 Nevertheless, in protecting
the general eligibility of voters, the Fourteenth Amendment recog-
nized that some states would choose or had chosen appointment pro-
cedures that did create a right of voters to choose electors for
president.9 4
Arising from a series of compromises between direct popular elec-
tions and legislative selection of the executive, between small and
large states, and between northern and southern states,9 5 the system
of electors represents a method of choosing officials that can, at the
discretion of the states, be made either to include a mass electorate in
the selection of electors and directing their votes or to create a delib-
erative body of electors whose sole task is to evaluate the qualifica-
tions and qualities of potential candidates.96 While the President of
the United States is elected by 538 electors, this Section shows that all
states have effected election procedures that do involve the general
electorate. As a result, the selection of electors is performed by the
same voters who participate in congressional and local elections.
Citizens of the United States who are not residents of a State or of
the District of Columbia are not eligible to participate in the selection
of electors for president and vice-president." In Igartdia-De La Rosa
v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confirmed
the inability of citizens residing in Puerto Rico to participate in choos-
ing the president, as the Constitution only allocates electors to
states.99 Gregorio Igarthia-de la Rosa, a United States citizen residing
in Puerto Rico, challenged the validity of the lack of participation of
residents of Puerto Rico in the presidential election process.100 In an
en-banc decision at the culmination of a series of challenges, Judge
Michael Boudin, Chief Judge, held that a specific constitutional provi-
sion cannot be unconstitutional and that no treaty or treaty-like docu-
93. See id.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2 ("But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States ... is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, . . . representation [in Congress] shall be reduced in
the proportion [of otherwise qualified voters inappropriately disenfranchised].").
95. Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and
One Person, One Vote, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2526, 2527 (2001).
96. See infra Section 1II.C (discussing variety in the manner of holding elections).
97. See About the Electors, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/electors.html#selection [https://
perma.cc/9T72-9LDS]. Twenty-seven of the fifty-one entities that select electors have
some provision requiring electors for president to follow a pledge to vote for a partic-
ular candidate. Id.
98. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. amend. XXIII. Because electors are allo-
cated only to states and to the District of Columbia, only the legislatures of those
entities have the power to allow their citizens to vote for electors.
99. Igarttia-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 147-48 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
100. Id. at 146-47.
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ment can grant rights in contravention of the Constitution. 1' Judge
Kermit Lipez, in concurrence, argued that the decision to provide
electors for a territory is a political question, and thus not within the
court's jurisdiction.1 0 2 Because the selection of electors is granted to
the states (and the District of Columbia), any resulting selection pro-
cess excludes United States citizens who reside elsewhere.'0 3 Thus
there is no constitutional right of a United States citizen to participate
in the selection of the president;104 however, when a state creates that
right, it must do so in a way that is consistent with the Constitution.105
All states currently allow a direct statewide vote for the selection of
electors, and nearly all ask the voters to choose by majority vote a
slate of electors committed to a candidate.106 This process involves
mass statewide elections on the scale of senatorial elections;107 how-
ever, in cases where a state favors one candidate over another by a
significant margin, spending to influence voters in that race in that
state is ineffective. As a result, presidential campaigns significantly
curtail spending in states in which neither side has an opportunity to
affect the outcome.0 The fact that campaigns restrain their own
speech (as expressed through the expenditure of money) where they
do not anticipate a strong benefit is suggestive, and has helped to
guide the solution proposed in this Comment.
a. Populist Objections to Current Presidential Elector Selection
The National Popular Vote ("NPV") is a proposal to affect the man-
ner by which electors for President and Vice President of the United
101. Id. at 148.
102. Id. at 153 (Lipez, J., concurring) ("[T]here are only two methods under our
Constitution by which a territory can receive electoral votes: through admission as a
state or by special amendment." (citations omitted)).
103. Id. at 147; see also Attorney Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017,
1019 (9th Cir. 1984) (declaring that residence outside a state or the District of Colum-
bia excludes participation in choosing presidential electors). Because state legislatures
have complete power to determine the selection of their electors, however, one
presumes that the architects of the National Popular Vote compact intend one day to
extend their scheme to include all citizens of the United States, rather than solely the
citizens of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. See infra notes 109-116 and
accompanying text.
104. Igartia-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 147.
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2.
106. Maine and Nebraska are the only states that assign their presidential electors
proportionally, both allocating one elector to each congressional district and two to
the statewide winner. Maine and Nebraska, FAIRVOTE (Dec. 10, 2009), http://
archive.fairvote.org/e-college/me-ne.htm [https://perma.cc/P3WD-ZX28].
107. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing the electorate for Congress).
108. More than ninety-nine percent of presidential campaign spending between
April 11 and election day on November 6 in 2012 was spent in just ten swing states.
Presidential Tracker 2012, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/presidential-tracker_
2012#2012_campaign-spending [https://perma.ccl57TE-RW4E] (last visited Oct. 1,
2016).
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States are selected.10 9 NPV is a plan to ensure that the majority of
electors choose the candidates that the majority of voters would have
chosen in a direct vote."' As of 2015, it was adopted by eleven states
that together control 165 electoral votes."'1 Through the passage of
uniform state statutes regarding the selection of electors, a group of
states that can muster sufficient electors to be a majority of the electo-
ral college pledge to choose electors who in turn will pledge to vote
for the candidate preferred by a reported majority of voters in the
United States.1 1 2 Because of the plenary power of state legislatures to
determine the manner of selecting electors,'13 this proposal allows for
a popular vote for candidates for President and Vice-President with-
out amending the Constitution.114 Its side effects may, however, work
against any attempt to limit the need for money in presidential
elections.
While the NPV proposal would serve to align the election of the
national executives with the means of selection of other federal and
state office-holders, its method of ensuring the direct effect of voters
on elections exacerbates the need for money in presidential election
campaigns by significantly increasing the size of the population that is
directly involved in (and capable of affecting) the choice.11 5 By mak-
ing every undecided voter in the United States an equal target of mass
marketing, the NPV would increase the amount of influence desired
by each campaign and would thus increase the amount of spending
required to exert that influence.' A populist advocate of direct de-
mocracy might initially value the direct election of a president more
109. Robert W. Bennett, Electoral College Reform at the State Level, in AMERICA
VOTES! A GUIDE TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 305, 310-13
(Benjamin E. Griffith ed., Am. Bar Ass'n 2d ed. 2012).
110. Id. at 310.
111. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NAT'L POPULAR VOTE!, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/explanation.php
[https://perma.cc/NBP2-CEYG] (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
112. Bennett, supra note 109, at 310.
113. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
114. If states choose the NPV as a means of rendering the electors less meaningful
than they currently are, they could further the overhaul by extending the franchise to
United States citizens not resident in any state. See supra notes 98-1.04 and accompa-
nying text. More absurdly, they could offer the choice of electors to non-citizens if
they so chose.
115. See supra Section II.D (discussing the effects of mass marketing).
116. Predictions vary, but less than a third of the states representing less than a
third of electoral votes are thought of as swing states. See Louis Jacobson, Will Swing
States Increase in the 2016 Presidential Election?, GOVERNING (Dec. 9, 2015), http://
www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-swing-states-2016-presidential-election.html
[https://perma.cc/UM7K-KTRA]; see also Frank Jacobs, United Swing States of
America: Presidential Election Battle Map, BIG THINK, http://bigthink.com/strange-
maps/584-united-swing-states-of-america-presidential-election-battle-map [https://
perma.cc/QM46-ZTL5] (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). With the NPV proposal, expanding
marketing to address all voters in all states would dramatically increase the amount of
marketing that is needed to reach all potential swing voters.
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than efforts to limit the influence of money; however, this Comment
argues that the resulting increased spending not only increases the in-
fluence of those who have money, but also dilutes the meaningful in-
put of the thoughts and opinions of each voter.
b. Federalist Objections to Current Presidential Elector Selection
States assume or even require that electors for President and Vice-
President abdicate their own judgment at the time of their vote in
favor of a pre-election commitment o a particular candidate (or a
candidate to be named later by the party), upon which the voting pop-
ulace has relied."' This abdication of judgment could have a negative
effect in the event of emergencies such as the untimely death of a
pledged candidate; however, states can make special provisions for
such emergencies."' The abdication of judgment further thwarts the
original vision of the Constitution by directing the actions of the elec-
tors as elected officials."' While no states compel their normal elected
officials to make later judgments in line with campaign promises,
many do so with respect to electors for President.12 0 In fact most
states make little or no indication on the ballot that the votes are be-
ing cast for electors, inducing the assumption that the electors are un-
able to exercise personal judgment.12 ' The result is that rather than
forming a representative, deliberative body whose members can study
candidates and make a judgment, the electors are currently not partic-
ipating in a republican form of government, but rather providing a
slight distortion to a direct popular vote.
2. Congressional Electors
Qualified voters for both Representatives and Senators are defined
by the states in their definition of the eligible voters for their legisla-
tures.'2 2 The federal legislators are to be chosen by the same people
qualified to choose the members of the larger house of each state's
legislature.123 While seemingly leaving that decision to the states, the
Constitution as amended has denied the states most flexibility in de-
termining the makeup of the electorate.12 4 Subject to valid restrictions
117. See generally Bennett, supra note 109, at 313-17 (discussing a proposal to com-
pel voting by electors for a promised candidate).
118. Id. at 316.
119. See id. at 316-17; see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230-31 (1952) (holding
that requiring an elector on a party slate to pledge to support the party's nominee was
constitutional, but not judging the enforceability of such a pledge).
120. More than half the states create an obligation on the electors to pledge their
vote to a particular candidate. See About the Electors supra note 97.
121. Bennett, supra note 109, at 316.
122. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII.
123. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII.
124. Compare id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (making state legislatures the sole determiners of
presidential elector selection methods), and id. amend. XXIII (extending presidential
elector selection rights to the District of Columbia) with id. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2
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on the basis of crime or rebellion and other restrictions (outside of sex
and age) that could trigger a reduction in representation,2 5 every citi-
zen of the United States residing in a state and aged eighteen or more
years must now be eligible to vote for state and federal legislators..2 6
3. Permissible Disenfranchisement
Nearly all citizens aged eighteen and over are eligible to vote in
local and federal elections. There are, however, exceptions. As noted
above, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly lists crime and rebellion
as permissible reasons for disenfranchisement.1 2 7
While the Fourteenth Amendment was passed as one of the Recon-
struction Amendments to ensure the legal equality of former slaves,
the Court has used its wording to uphold felon disenfranchisement.128
The extent of disenfranchisement can take a number of forms, from
exclusion from voting during a term associated with the sentence to
exclusion that is indefinite or explicitly for life. For example, in Texas
a citizen of the United States residing in Texas aged at least 18 years
who registers to vote is a qualified voter, unless a court has judged the
person mentally incapacitated (totally or with respect to voting) or has
been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned or fully dis-
charged the sentence (including any supervision).129
Other states continue to bar convicted felons from voting indefi-
nitely. For example, there is a provision dating from 1889 in the con-
stitution of the State of Washington excluding convicted felons from
voting unless their civil rights are restored.1.3 0 An automatic provi-
(limiting the permissible criteria for excluding voters to a short list of offenses and
providing for reduced representation for violations), and id. amend. XIX (invalidating
any restriction of voting on the basis of sex), and id. amend. XXVI (invalidating any
restriction of voting on the basis of age, so long as voters are aged eighteen years or
more).
125. See infra Section III.B.3.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXVI.
127. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
128. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) ("We hold that the under-
standing of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the ex-
press language of § 2 and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the
Amendment's applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling sig-
nificance in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations on the
franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause by this
Court.").
129. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (West 2010). An interesting topic for further
development is whether the exclusion of (male) mentally incapacitated persons from
voting is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's sanctions contingent on the
denial of the vote. All states likely make exclusions at approximately the same small
rate, so the proportional reductions in representation would likely have no effect. For
a second example of disenfranchisement during the term of a sentence, see N.Y.
ELEC. LAw § 5-106 (Consol. 2009).
130. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("All persons convicted of infamous crime
unless restored to their civil rights . . . are excluded from the elective franchise.").
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sional restoration was passed by the Washington legislature in 2009.131
Florida's voter qualification statute similarly excludes convicted felons
unless their right to vote has been restored.1 3 2 Kentucky similarly ex-
cludes convicted felons from voting unless they are pardoned by the
executive.13 3
Unlike the case of convicted criminals, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not explicitly permit the disenfranchisement of men over the age
of twenty-one for other reasons such as mental disability.1 34 in fact,
states should lose representation in the House of Representatives for
such denial or abridgement of the right to vote.13 5 Nevertheless, most
states do disenfranchise such citizens reasoning that their inability to
understand the issues at stake makes them unsuitable voters. 36 Rea-
sons for the lack of consequences under the Fourteenth Amendment
may include that states tend to disenfranchise persons declared incom-
petent at approximately equal rates, that the purpose of the Amend-
ment was to protect against race-based discrimination, or that a
general consensus that incompetent people should not vote keeps any-
one from challenging the constitutionality of the policy.
C. Manner of Holding Elections
The Constitution delegates to the states the power to set the man-
ner in which elections are held to choose senators and representa-
tives.'3 7 The same clause does, however, grant Congress the power to
preempt state decisions..3 Federal legislation on the manner of hold-
ing elections has been limited outside general areas of regulating the
equality of voting rights, ensuring the reliability of voting systems, and
131. Act effective July 26, 2009, ch. 325, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 1649 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 9, 10, and 29A WASH. REV. CODE ANN. (WEST
2014)).
132. FLA. STAT. § 97.041(2)(b) (2016).
133. Ky. CONsT. § 145; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.025(1) (LexisNexis 2014).
134. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
135. Id. ("But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced . . . .").
136. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177 ("No person ... who is mentally incom-
petent, shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil and political rights or re-
moval of disability."); Wyo. CONsT. art. VI, § 6 ("All persons adjudicated to be
mentally incompetent . . . , unless restored to civil rights, are excluded from the elec-
tive franchise."). See generally Kay Schriner et al., Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the
ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437 (2000).
137. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
138. Id. As a curiosity, the one exception to the rights of Congress to control the
election of its members'is the "Places of chusing Senators." Id. This was not changed
by the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. See id. amend. XVII.
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regulating campaign spending.139 Federal law also explicitly preempts
state campaign finance laws as they would relate to federal offices.1 40
The federal power is not, however, absolute. In Shelby County v.
Holder, the Court found that the preclearance restrictions on some
states in the Voting Rights Act burdened the equality of state sover-
eignty in a way that was no longer justified by the current state of
affairs, striking the preclearance provision.14. The Voting Rights Act
had required certain identified states with a history of discriminatory
voting practices to obtain approval from the Federal Election Com-
mission before making substantive changes to their election proce-
dures and redistricting.1 42 While the need to eliminate such practices
was initially seen as a compelling need, allowing federal power tempo-
rarily to overbalance that of the states, the Court held in Shelby
County that given developments in the past half century, the imbal-
ance of power was no longer permissible.1 4 3
1. Redistricting
Federal courts are frequently asked to review the constitutionality
of redistricting plans for state and federal legislative districts.144 After
the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1964, states with a history of
discriminatory redistricting were required to clear changes to their
electoral processes with a federal body before making the change.14 5
While redistricting is a state responsibility, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's requirement of equal protection makes the oversight of that
equality a matter for the federal legislature and courts.1 4 6 One such
case was decided by the Supreme Court on direct appeal from a three-
judge panel during the writing of this Comment, confirming the long-
held validity of congressional redistricting on the basis of the total
population even if that creates an imbalance in the number of eligible
voters in each district.14 7
139. See generally 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101-30146 (Supp. II 2015).
140. 52 U.S.C. § 30143 (Supp. II 2015).
141. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
142. Id. at 2620.
143. Id. at 2629.
144. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (clarifying in a Florida
case the standard for impermissible vote dilution); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (affirming the invalidation of an Alabama apportionment plan not based on
population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection claims
on congressional redistricting may be justiciable).
145. See 52 U.S.C. § 10305 (Supp. II 2015) (describing the use of federal electoral
observers in subdivisions identified by the Attorney General and through other
means).
146. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §§ 2, 5; see, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 (enunciat-
ing the principle that vagaries of location within a state should not dilute
representation).
147. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). Justice Ginsburg reviewed the rele-
vant constitutional history, Court decisions, and common practice to find no impedi-
ment to the nearly universal practice of forming districts on the basis of total
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The requirement of equal protection is, however, subject to reason-
able variations. In Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission, the Court
held that variations in size among West Virginia's three congressional
districts did not violate equal protection requirements if the extent of
variation was justified by legitimate state interests.14 8 Because of the
centrality of the process of choosing representatives to the political
process of the United States, allegations of improper denial of partici-
pation in the process generally provide standing for a lawsuit.14 9
2. Voter Registration
In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., the Court held
that the provisions of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993150
preempted Arizona laws that required proof of citizenship beyond the
statement of the prospective voter.'51 That statute prescribed forms
that must be acceptable for voter registration, making it impossible for
states to add conditions.1 5 2 The constitutional supremacy of federal
voting legislation ensured that state legislation could not undercut the
convenience sought by Congress for absentee voters.1 53
3. Absentee Ballots
The specification for federal absentee ballots, however, assumes
both that political parties are a part of elections and that the process
by which states choose their presidential electors will result in electors
committed to a particular candidate.154 By allowing a vote indicating
the name of a political party to be taken as a vote for the representa-
tive of that party in the election, the statute assumes a system in which
parties compete represented by their champions. Because this is not a
population. Id. at 1127-33. In the constitutional history, she mentioned the failed at-
tempt at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass an amend-
ment that required apportionment by the number of eligible voters. Id. at 1128. The
Fourteenth Amendment, having defined citizenship, extends equal protection to "any
person" rather than "any citizen" or "any voter." See U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1.
The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that equal protection requires equal rep-
resentation of the residents of a district in Congress rather than the equal weight of
each vote in selecting such representatives. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1126 (citation omit-
ted). While the Court did not decide whether population-based representation was
required, Justice Thomas argued that it was but one of several permissible options. Id.
at 1142 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
148. Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012) (citing Karcher v. Dag-
gett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)).
149. CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.4 (3d ed. 2008) ("Electoral interests are among
the abstract interests that support standing in a wide variety of settings.").
150. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. H§ 20501-20511 (Supp. II 2015)).
151. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013).
152. Id. at 2255-56; see also 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511 (Supp. II 2015).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see also 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511 (Supp. II 2015).
154. 52 U.S.C. § 20303 (Supp. II 2015).
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requirement of the political process, some manners of choosing office
holders may not permit states to give the statute effect. If they are not
repealed or amended, these assumptions could require accommoda-
tion in plans to change the manner in which elections for Congress are
held."' Given the explicit power of state legislatures to determine
how electors are chosen, however, it is unlikely that the federal absen-
tee ballot rule would preempt state determinations for presidential
elections.1.5 6
4. Choice by the People
The constitutional provisions that people should choose their repre-
sentatives and Senators have not been interpreted directly by the Su-
preme Court. In United States v. Classic, the Court did describe in
dicta that the right to choose includes "the right of qualified voters
within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congres-
sional elections." 15 The meaning of that right to cast ballots, however,
has not been tested. As a result, it is unclear whether a manner of
choosing representatives or senators must make the final decision the
result of a direct ballot of all voters in a district or state, or if voters
may choose among them representatives to whom they delegate the
power to choose their representatives in Congress. Given the choice
of the Supreme Court not to consider hypothetical disputes as cases or
controversies within its jurisdiction, an answer to the question will
likely not be available until a state or the federal government imple-
ments a system under which the people choose their representatives in
a manner other than a direct election.15 8
D. Political Parties and Access to the Ballot
While political parties are not demanded by the Constitution, their
ubiquity in the American political process has led to assumptions and
accommodations in state and federal law that may need to be ad-
dressed by some proposals. In Nader v. Keith, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld an Illinois statute excusing the nominees of
previously successful political parties from submitting a large number
155. Id. § 20303(c)(1).
156. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2, with 52 U.S.C. § 20303(c)(2) (Supp. II
2015).
157. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
158. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362
(1911) ("If such actions as are here attempted, to determine the validity of legislation,
are sustained, the result will be that this court, instead of keeping within the limits of
judicial power, and deciding cases or controversies arising between opposing parties,
as the Constitution intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the nature
of advice concerning legislative action,-a function never conferred upon it by the
Constitution, and against the exercise of which this court has steadily set its face from
the beginning.").
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of validated petition signatures.159 The statute that was upheld pro-
vides a minimum number of validated nominating signatures for most
candidates, but excuses nominees of established political parties from
the petition requirement.16 0
This delegation of the nomination process to political parties helps
to ensure that those who already have political power have enhanced
access to retain it. The ability to associate with others is explicitly pro-
tected in the Constitution,16 ' and it provides efficiencies of scale in
many electoral processes. The process of state-run primary elections
to select party nominees has a number of adverse side effects. By rec-
ognizing parties that have had popular support in the past as eligible
for streamlined access to the ballot, the states create a two-tiered sys-
tem in which new voices must overcome more hurdles of paperwork
and procedure than do established parties.1 .6 2 By narrowing the field
to a champion for each party many months before the election, cur-
rent processes do not allow for changes in the understood judgment
and abilities of those candidates and of those who were eliminated in
the primary election. These side effects of the party primary system of
identifying general election candidates would be reduced by the pro-
posal in this Comment.
IV. COMPARATIVE DECISION MAKING
It is instructive to consider decision-making processes in a variety of
forums. While both direct and representative democracy abound, the
Constitution mandates representative decision making in a number of
ways, but nowhere mandates direct democracy.1 6 3 Other decision-
making systems also provide interesting insights.
A. The United States Constitution: Decisions by Representatives
The United States has a long tradition of selecting a group of repre-
sentative citizens to make important decisions. The Constitution, for
example, guarantees a jury for every criminal trial.1 64 By the time of
159. Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/10-3 (West 2010)).
160. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-3 (2008); see also id. at 5/10-2 (defining established
political parties); id. at 5/10-4 (establishing that signatures must be accompanied by
residence address and must be collected from registered voters in the ninety days
before the deadline for submission).
161. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
162. See supra Section III.D.
163. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 1-3 (House of Representatives and Senate); id. art
II, § 1 (electors for President and Vice President); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (jury trial for all
crimes); id. amend. VI (jury trial for all criminal trials). While Congress is to be cho-
sen by the people and no person is to be denied equal protection, the Constitution
does not specify that such choice require a popular election for any office. See id. art.
I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII.
164. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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the signing of the Magna Carta, the institution of the jury in England
had stabilized as a way of having a small group of citizens stand as
representatives to make an important decision, and it has remained
essentially unchanged to this day.16 5 Juries today tend to be formed
through a combination of random selection and disqualification.16 6
The process works because there are two clear adversaries working to
protect their interests and a judge to oversee the process.6  The pro-
cess of winnowing a fair cross section of the population to a smaller
group of individuals we ask to make a particular judgment is the cor-
nerstone of the jury trial process. The series of preliminary elections
to identify trustworthy representatives proposed in this Comment
would serve a similar end through the judgment of the voters of the
person with the best judgment to represent hem further in the electo-
ral process.
Similarly, the much-reviled process of choosing electors for Presi-
dent of the United States is a procedure of representative decision
making enshrined in the Constitution.1 6' As in the institution of a jury,
it allows the selection of representatives by the states who can use
their independent judgment to make the best possible decision.1 6 9
While it is not currently used in that manner (by the choice of the
legislatures of the several states), the selection of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice President of the United States is, like the selection of a
jury, the creation of a special-purpose decision-making body standing
in for the greater body of citizens who are not exposed to everything
that would be required to make a truly informed decision."o
While the jury and the electors for President and Vice President are
special-purpose bodies of representatives elected to make a single de-
165. Magna Carta (1225), reprinted in RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA
THROUGH THE AGES app. at 231 (2003); see also History of Jury Duty, U.S. COURTS:
W. DIST. OF Mo., http://www.mow.uscourts.gov/district/jury/jury-history.html [https://
perma.cc/3C3K-PD9K].
166. To meet the requirement of the Sixth Amendment, juries in the United States
must be drawn from "a representative cross-section of the community," by whatever
means the court chooses. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). To meet the
guarantee of an impartial jury, "all persons otherwise qualified for jury service are
subject to examination as to actual bias" and to legislative imputations of implied
bias. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936).
167. Once a panel of potential jurors has been identified, the two parties to the jury
trial are often able to exercise both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges to
eliminate jurors from the pool. Challenges for cause eliminate actual or implied bias
to help maintain the impartiality of the jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Peremptory
challenges require no stated reason. As a result, they allow the parties to eliminate
the extremes of perceived potential bias against them, but they are controversial be-
cause they can appear arbitrary or discriminatory. See generally Roger Allan Ford,
Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17
GEO. MASON L. REv. 377, 380-87 (2010).
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text (discussing state legislation
stripping electors of their judgment).
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cision, the House of Representatives and the Senate created by the
Constitution are bodies of general-purpose representatives with the
power to make a wide range of decisions.'7 1 The representative nature
of democracy in the United States reflects the nation's recognition
that the ability of a select body to focus on examining and evaluating
choices is of significant value in making reasonable decisions.1.72
Opening important decisions to a wider group who may not have the
time or expertise to perform the requisite investigation can lead to an
inferior decision-making process.17 3 Unfortunately, unlike the focused
attention one expects of juries and (should they exercise independent
thought) presidential electors, the members of Congress are required
by the current manner of their choosing to spend much of their time
fundraising, significantly reducing their ability to focus on making
sound decisions.
A century ago, the United States abandoned another form of repre-
sentative democracy. With the ratification of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, the selection of senators was removed from state legislatures
and put into the same process of choice by the people that the Consti-
tution initially specified only for the House of Representatives.17 4 Sig-
nificant substantive arguments can be made for the separation of the
selection of senators from the work of state legislatures. Although
there is justification for making that separation, transferring the
choice to be a direct vote by those of the people who are eligible and
willing voters creates statewide elections and virtually ensures signifi-
cant spending in any contested election. It should come as no surprise
that the plan was significantly supported by the mass-media giant of
the time: William Randolph Hearst.175 By ensuring statewide lections
of senators, Mr. Hearst brought a great deal of value to his massive
news organization and wire services, giving him a near monopoly on
the efficient coverage of an entire state. Given the side effect of sena-
tors spending time on fundraising rather than on governing, the pro-
posal in this Comment suggests that it is time to return senatorial
selection, as with all selection, to a form of representative democracy.
The state legislatures do not need the job any more than senators
need to be fundraising; however, a special-purpose body chosen to
select a senator can focus on the job and make a sound decision.
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-3.
172. Id. art. IV, § 4.
173. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816) ("[I]f a nation
expects to be ignorant & free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was &
never will be."), quoted in Jennifer L. Hochschild, If Democracies Need Informed Vot-
ers, How Can They Thrive While Expanding Enfranchisement?, 9 ELECTION L.J. 111
(2010).
174. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII.
175. See C. H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASs DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 82-83 (rev. ed. 2014) (describing Hearst's suc-
cess in yellow journalism with "The Treason of the Senate" in Cosmopolitan in 1906).
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B. Other Manners of Choosing
1. Direct Popular Election
The most commonly known direct, popular, national election is the
choice of players for the All-Star Game in Major League Baseball.1 7 6
There is a requirement that each team be represented.177 The result is
a single-game competition between teams that are selected by a com-
bination of the voting public, the complete pool of eligible candidates
(the players), and the manager of the team.1 78 The result is also a
showcase of celebrities rather than the creation of an actual team that
would be effective in normal competition.7 A similar relatively un-
regulated direct election was introduced by the television series Amer-
ican Idol, and has become a part of the norm for reality television.18 0
These election processes, with a reduction of the field to just a
handful of candidates before the general election, are the method by
which most elections are currently held in the United States. The re-
duction of the field through party primaries serves to combine the di-
rect election by voters with a battle between two champions on the
part of the candidates.
2. Parliamentary Systems
Most English-speaking democracies have inherited the British par-
liamentary system, due in large part to the number of colonies in the
vast former empire that were able to separate peacefully from the
United Kingdom in the twentieth century.18' The parliamentary sys-
tem as generally implemented consists of a house whose members are
176. Because the only elected representatives-the president and vice president-
are elected in a representative process rather than in direct democracy, they do not fit
this category. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
177. See Murray Chass, BASEBALL; Players Union Accepts Change to the All-Star
Game, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/02/sports/baseball-
players-union-accepts-change-to-the-all-star-game.html.
178. Eric Seidman, The Convoluted All-Star Selection Process, FANGRAPHS: BASE-
BALL BLOGS (July 4, 2011), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/the-convoluted-all-star-
selection-process/ [https://perma.cc/ELC7-S582] (describing the three-tiered selection
process and pointing out shortcomings of the combination of popular vote, voting
among potentially under-informed colleagues, and constrained expert selection).
179. See id. Seidman decries the result because the fan-based vote is a popularity
contest, the player vote does nothing to ensure that the players know the best players
in every position on every team, and the manager selection is constrained to include a
representative of every team. Id. The first two criticisms of popularity contests and
lack of informed decision making could be applied to nearly every popular election.
180. American Idol XV Voting Frequently Asked Questions, Fox, http://
www.fox.com/voting-faq [https://perma.cc/FD34-FP5C] (describing a process intended
to limit the effect of multiple voting, but still seeming to permit a motivated voter with
enough phones or e-mail addresses to cast one hundred or more votes).
181. See History of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), COM-
MONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY Ass'N, http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/Main/About/His-
tory/Main/About/Organisation/History/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/CYM7-626Q]
(last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
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elected from local districts to represent the district both by participat-
ing in the national legislature and by selecting the ministers from
among their ranks to be the executive of the country.18 2 The use of
representatives to select among candidates for government offices is
reminiscent of the electoral college18 3 and the former method for se-
lecting United States senators.184 The unique features of the parlia-
mentary elections for ministers are that (1) the candidates are
members of the voting body and (2) the voting body is convened not
only for the selection of ministers but also for ongoing legislative
duties.
3. Loya Jirga
The loya firga in Afghanistan is a special-purpose assembly of rep-
resentatives of multiple tribes to select a leader or make a decision."'
While it has a long history in Afghan culture, two recent instances
were the emergency loya firga in 2002 and the constitutional loya jirga
in 2003.186 The specifics of selection vary from instance to instance,
but in the constitutional loya jirga of 2003 the vast majority of dele-
gates were selected by community representatives, with some elected
from special communities and about ten percent appointed by Presi-
dent Karzei."' A similar selection process populated the larger emer-
gency loya jirga in 2002 that formed the transitional government.88
The nature of the representative democracy of the loya jirga has two
important features: the use of a body of representatives to choose a
government and the relative independence of that body from the
work of governing.
V. A PROPOSAL TO MAKE EXTREME SPENDING UNNECESSARY
Representative Democracy Brackets is a solution that addresses the
concerns of the effect of money on elections while respecting the First
Amendment, maintaining the inclusion of all voters in the process,
and improving the use of the decision-making skills of the voters. It
respects the First Amendment by making no demands on it. Because
the plan will function regardless of the spending of candidates or in-
terested parties, there is no restriction or burden on the free speech of
anyone. It keeps everyone involved in the same way that an open
182. See generally Josd Antonio Cheibub et al., Government Selection and Execu-
tive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies, 38 W. EUR. POL.
969 (2015).
183. See supra Section III.B.1.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
185. See generally J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan,
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 557 (2007) (discussing in several sections the role of the loya
jirga in ratifying the constitution and as a constitutional body).
186. Id. at 569.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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tournament does-all voters are welcome to participate in the first
round, and the participants in each round select the best representa-
tive among them to participate in the next round. It makes best use of
the skills of all voters by using their innate abilities to judge the trust-
worthiness and abilities of people that they meet. That sounds like a
great plan, if only the reader could glean the solution from those
characteristics.
As its name suggests Representative Democracy Brackets is a series
of contests. Rather than a series of head-to-head competitions be-
tween potential senators, however, it is a series of contests to identify
a special-purpose body of electors to make a choice of the best sena-
tor for a state.8 (The same applies to any other elected official, of
course.) At each level a limited group selects one of its number to
represent that group at the next level. Once the number of electoral
representatives o selected in an appropriate district has been reduced
to a manageable number, that group of representatives will select the
new holders of offices at that level. The manageable number should
be variable, but it should nonetheless be small enough to ensure and
make clear that all members of the group will be able both to talk to
each other and to meet all the candidates with whose evaluation they
are entrusted.
Other scholars have suggested somewhat similar approaches. For
example, John Gastil proposed in 2000 that randomly selected panels
of citizens could take the time to evaluate candidates and issues for
the benefit of under-informed voters.90 While that would provide
some of the benefits this Comment suggests, the League of Women
Voters and other outlets already provide similar non-partisan informa-
tion, and the random and non-binding nature of the deliberative re-
sults makes few guarantees that the information would overcome
mass marketing influences.
While speaking primarily about approaches to make successful ver-
sions of campaign finance reform still involving restricted contribu-
tions or spending in light of recent decisions, Jocelyn Benson makes
189. While the proposal in this Comment owes its primary inspiration to the
scheme of Electors for President and Vice-President set forth in the Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton in his remarks to the Constitutional Convention on June 18,
1787, proposed that both the Governour (chief executive) and the senators (not lim-
ited to two per state) be elected by groups of electors specially chosen by the people
for that purpose. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18thcentury/debates-618.asp [https://perma.cc/5RWD-A6XX]. Hamilton proposed
that both senators and the executive serve for life in part as a means of reducing
corruption. Id. While that proposal is a possible way to reduce the money in elections
by making them less frequent, this Comment does not follow Hamilton's suggestion,
as it could tend to make those elected less accountable.
190. JOHN GASTIL, By POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DE-
MOCRACY THROUGH DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS 124 (2000).
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the point that states are the laboratories of electoral reform.1 91 Build-
ing on Professor Benson's premise, the implementation of Represen-
tative Democracy Brackets (or other forms of representative choice of
candidates) can be done by each state in its own way. Any state that
implements such a plan immediately becomes a target for more atten-
tion in presidential elections, and it should be able to execute its local
elections with more efficiency and better decision-making as well. As
other states observe the effects, they would be able to implement im-
proved versions of the process.
A. Respect for First Amendment
"Go ahead and scream your head off! We're miles from where any-
one can hear you!"'.92 While the First Amendment guarantees that the
government not hinder speech, it makes no promise that anyone must
listen when a person speaks nor that the investment of additional
money will make communication more effective.
This proposal does not require any concessions from the First
Amendment. People can be encouraged to say anything they like. The
point of the proposed reforms is to subordinate the information gath-
ered from mass media to the information that can be gained by inter-
action within voting groups. Because the method of selecting
candidates would eliminate the value of and thus the need for mass
marketing as a part of political campaigns, it would have the effect of
reducing the undue influence of money.
Despite its elimination or reduction of the influence of money, the
proposal does not ask any legislature, whether state or federal, to limit
the speech of any individual or corporation. The apparent quid pro
quo restrictions that the Court upheld in Buckley would not be neces-
sary because politicians would not be asking supporters for money in
large volumes. The corporate donations and communications whose
restrictions the Court overturned in Citizens United and American
Tradition Partnership would not have their mass-marketing effect, but
would be allowed if the corporations (in the best interests of their
shareholders) so chose. Similarly, the coercive burden on speech
found in Davis and American Free Enterprise would not be necessary.
Candidates could spend money as they desired without any undue
pressure from the government. Because the final pool of decision
makers would be limited, regulations on them as sworn public ser-
vants (and near-constant media attention) would ensure that they
were not corrupted by money, foreign or domestic.
191. Jocelyn Benson, Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the Post-Citi-
zens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 767-68 (2012).
192. PEE-WEE's BIG ADVENTURE (Warner Brothers 1985). While attempting to co-
erce a rival into providing information on his stolen vehicle, Pee-wee Herman illus-
trates that the right to speak implies neither a right to be heard nor a guarantee of the
effectiveness of that speech.
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B. Representative Democracy
The proposal made in this Comment may be the best way of guar-
anteeing the states a republican form of government that we can con-
ceive of.1 93 While most students of constitutional law breeze past the
guarantee clause in Article IV, its promise of representative democ-
racy is enshrined in the Constitution every bit as much as the power to
tax, the requirement of a "case or controversy" for federal court juris-
diction, and the commission of foreign policy to the executive. The
commitment to a republican form of government should weigh heavily
in any consideration of the appropriateness of a method of choosing
candidates that follows representative principles.
C. Choosing a Representative You Trust
A key benefit of the current proposal is its use of people's ability to
evaluate each other in person rather than relying on marketing to con-
vince them of the quality of candidates. People have an innate ability
to do three things: assimilate language, recognize faces, and judge the
character of others.1 94 While there will always be confidence men who
are able to mislead those who would otherwise be expected to be an
appropriate judge of character, a group of several hundred people is
less likely to be taken in, and a group of several hundred people se-
lected by the initial round for the quality of their judgment is even less
likely to be deceived.
To show that those chosen for their judgment are exercising that
judgment appropriately, it will be necessary to build in mechanisms
that help maintain that trust. The people participating beyond the first
round of the process will need to agree to be available to research and
make good choices, and the public will need to have transparency to
understand the information available to those continuing in the brack-
ets and the contacts they make during the election process.
D. Potential Obstacles
There are a number of potential obstacles to the implementation of
a new method by which the people choose their representatives in
Congress, electors for President and Vice President, and holders of
others offices. Political parties, media outlets, those who are invested
in the current process of bundling and other fundraising activities, and
193. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
194. See John Macnamara, Cognitive Basis of Language Learning in Infants, 79
PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1972); Mark Halpern, How Children Learn Their Mother Tongue:
They Don't, 45 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 1173 (2015) (exploring the acquisition of
language as the formatting of the brain); Arash Afraz, Head to Toe, in the Head, 112
PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 15004 (2015) (describing cognitive wiring for
facial and behavioral recognition); Wim De Neys et al., Adolescents Gradually Im-
prove at Detecting Trustworthiness from the Facial Features of Unknown Adults, 47 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 17 (2015).
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people who expect that their wealth alone can earn them face time
with a candidate will need to change some of their behaviors.
1. Court Challenges to Revised Election Processes
A dramatic change to the manner in which elections are held would
likely lead to legal challenges to the new rules. Such challenges are
likely to come in the form of definitions of the word "choose" and
interpretations of the meaning of equal participation in the exercise of
such choice.
Because the Constitution explicitly entrusts the States and the Con-
gress with the power to determine the manner in which representa-
tives and senators are chosen, any change to the manner of elections is
likely to fail out of deference to the legislature.19 5 As mentioned
above, the Equal Protection Clause will require that the methods they
implement will treat all votes equally at each level of the process. Be-
yond that, the states can implement their electoral brackets in a vari-
ety of ways, unless the Congress determines that it wants to prescribe
a standard election procedure that applies to the entire nation.
Similarly, the Constitution gives state legislatures the sole power to
determine how electors for president are to be selected.196 This power
is less susceptible to challenge than the selection of representatives in
Congress because the power granted to the states is absolute. The dif-
ference in the case of presidential electors is that Congress does not
have the power to preempt the decisions of the states. While the fed-
eral government can mandate procedures for the election of repre-
sentatives and Senators, it cannot specify the means by which electors
for President are selected to represent each state.
The definition of the words "chosen" and "elected" could be chal-
lenged in an attempt to suggest that participation in the first round of
the election process is not participation in the choice of the candi-
date.197 While there could be arguments on either side of that ques-
tion, none of the arguments against validity appear so compelling that
they would outweigh the policy decision of a legislature in the eyes of
the Supreme Court. Because the method of choosing is in the hands of
the states or of the Congress, any method that can be interpreted as
choosing is likely to be so interpreted by the Court.
There could also be equal protection questions; however, an imple-
mentation that guaranteed equal access to the process for all eligible
voters and the equal representation of all residents in a state or dis-
trict would likely be able to withstand such challenges.
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
196. Id. art. 1I, § 1, cl. 2.
197. See id. art I, § 2, cl. 1 ("chosen ... by the People"); see also id. amend. XVII
("elected by the people").
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2. Political Parties
Political parties have built a vast infrastructure to support their
branding and their candidates. Major changes to the manner in which
elections are held would require them to approach their political ac-
tivities somewhat differently. They may want to change their focus
from branding to advocacy of issue positions that support their con-
stituencies. They may also want to expand their organizations to help
their members understand the choices at each level of the bracketing
and to make recommendations to help supplement the evaluations of
the voters themselves. Regardless of their choices, the First Amend-
ment guarantee of the freedom of association will be protected, and
parties that seek to enhance their members' understanding and per-
ception of the issues will remain valuable.
3. Media Companies
While traditional campaign coverage would change dramatically,
there will be opportunities for coverage of the process and their crea-
tive minds will also find new ways to evaluate and handicap choices.
People throughout the United States are able to describe the achieve-
ments of members of their favorite sports teams, their opposition, and
their prospects. With appropriate coverage of perennial members of
the representative groups who decide on the holders of public offices,
those individuals may also become household names, and political
commentary, rather than reporting the measured effect of marketing
on the masses, will be able to report on the demonstrated choices
from the past and predictions of the application of such decision mak-
ing in the current contests.
The news media may also serve a strong role in preventing the dev-
olution of the process into the smoke-filled rooms of old-style party
machine politics. Given the short term in which the Representative
Democracy Brackets will be in place, there will be little opportunity
for new influences to corrupt these temporary special-purpose repre-
sentatives. Nevertheless, the temptation will certainly arise. Conse-
quently, the implementation of the process might temporarily require
those who rise through the process to waive some of their privacy to
ensure that undue influence is not introduced. This waiver of privacy
may assist the media not only in their investigatory role to safeguard
the process, but also in their entertainment role in highlighting the
celebrity and the foibles of those entrusted with these decisions.
To tie back to the brackets theme, one can imagine impressive color
commentary on the process, with statistics on perennial participants in
the process and evocative back stories introducing relative newcom-
ers.'9 8 While the goal of the changes proposed in this Comment is to
198. If, as it seems, the process of delivering information to the public is moving
from one of serious, informed debate towards one of entertainment value, we must
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improve decision making in part by having decision-makers focus on
making a meaningful and informed decision, using some of the tech-
niques of sports journalists to make the detail and the participants
entertaining might help with voter participation and interest. While
most people do not have time to track every action of the senators and
representative they currently vote for, participants in this process,
with the assistance of the media, will be able to see the public actions
of the person they selected to represent them at the next level.
VI. CONCLUSION
The system of Representative Democracy Brackets is proposed as a
manner of holding elections that is consistent with the United States
Constitution, but which nevertheless has the potential to reduce the
actual or apparent undue influence of money on candidates and on
the political process. It would make each decision in the process,
whether to choose representatives for the next higher level or to make
the final choice of an office holder, a decision among a limited set of
people who have the ability and the time to evaluate the choices in
person. Because the in-person decision-making would eliminate the
need for mass marketing, the ability for money to influence the pro-
cess would be eliminated. As a result, unlike recent approaches to
campaign finance reform that have burdened the speech of candidates
and other interested parties, this proposal if implemented, should re-
sult in a constitutional means to have meaningful elections by the peo-
ple with a minimum of financial influence.
There are continuing efforts to restrict the ability of individuals and
organizations to use their resources to project their political opin-
ions.199 On the surface, most such efforts appear to run afoul of recent
First Amendment decisions. It is possible, however, that the increasing
level of spending from all quarters may at some point tip the balance
such that the quid pro quo corruption protections upheld in Buckley
will be extended to allow restrictions on the perceived quid pro quo of
outsized spending in open or veiled independent support of candi-
dates. That has not yet happened, and it is equally possible that the
Court will continue to expand its regard for free speech such that even
find ways to make the process entertaining without having all decisions informed by
mass marketing.
199. See generally Campaign Finance Legislation Database, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (July 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-cam
paigns/campaign-finance-database-2015-onward.aspx [https://perma.cc/MW46-G733].
See also Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after McCutcheon, Citi-
zens United, and SpeechNow, (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Pa-
per No. 485, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1945&context=public lawandlegal-theory. But see Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond
Campaign Finance Reform, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1127 (2016) (arguing for a focus on in-
creased democratic responsiveness through an informed and engaged electorate).
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restrictions on direct campaign donations will no longer be
permissible.
Regardless of future developments in First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the proposal in this Comment has the additional benefit of en-
trusting important decisions to small groups that have the time and
resources to obtain and evaluate the relevant facts before making the
choice. As a result, those who represent he residents of our states and
districts will be chosen with the solemnity with which we determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and with which the Constitution
would have us select the president. "And even if we accept, as the
basic tenet of true democracy, that one moron is as good as one ge-
nius, is it necessary to go one step farther and hold that two morons
are better than one genius?"2 00 A system, such as that proposed in this
Comment, which ensures that every eligible voter is able to use his or
her best judgment in selecting a representative for the next step of the
process while ensuring that those who make the ultimate decision
have the time and resources to make a well founded decision, ensures
that all who participate in the process make a meaningful
contribution.
200. Leo Szilard, The Voice of the Dolphins, in THE VOICE OF THE DOLPHINS AND
OTHER STORIES 47, 71 (Stanford Univ. Press 1992) (1961). Szilard was, as an early
patentee of a nuclear reactor, a genius, and thus biased.
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